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Abstract. Safety and secrecy are formulated for a deterministic pro-
gramming language. A safety property is defined as a set of program 
traces and secrecy is defined as a binary relation on traces, character-
izing a form of Noninterference. Safety properties may have sound and 
complete execution monitors whereas secrecy ha.s no such monitor. 
1 Introduction 
It is oft.en argued that information flow is not safety. One argument. is refine-
ment based and originates \Vith Gra.y and l\IcLean [5]. They observed that for 
nondeterministic systems , a class of information flow properties, namely the 
Possibilistic ~oninterfcrence properties, arc not safety properties. The reason is 
because t.hey are not preserved under replacement. of nondeterminism in a sys-
tem with determinism. An example is an implementation of nondeterministic 
scheduling using a round-robin time-sliced scheduler [8]. A possibilistic property 
basically asserts that certain system inputs do not interfere with the possibility 
of certain events. So nondeterminism is essential to such properties. A safety 
property, on the other hand, is insensitive to this kind of refinement.. Another 
argument. commonly heard is that information flow is a predicate of trace sets 
whereas safety is a predicate of individual traces. This argument can be applied 
to deterministic systems. \Ve examine it more carefully and present a secrecy 
criterion for programs that relates secrecy and safety. 
2 A characterization of safety properties 
Consider a. deterministic programming language with variables: 
(e1;p) e::=:r, In e1+e2 I e1-e2 I e1=e2 
(cmd) c ::= :r, := e c1; c2 I if e then ct else c2 I while e doc 
* This material is based upon activities supported by the National Science Foundation 
under Agreement Ko. CCR-9612345 [sic]. This paper appears in Proceedings of the 
6th Int'! Symposium on Static Analysis, Venezia Italy, 22-24 Sep 1999. 
Herc x stands for a variable and n for an integer literal. Integers arc the only 
values; we use 0 for false and nonzero for true. ~ot.e that expressions do not have 
side effects, nor do they contain partial operations like division. 
A transition semantics is given for the language in Fig. 1. \Ve assume that 
expressions arc evaluated atomically. Thus we simply extend a memoryµ in the 
obvious way to map expressions to integers, writing µ(e.) to denote the value of 




.1; E dom (p) 
(:.r := e, ti) ---+ 1i[:.r := 1i(e)] 
(c1;c2,p.)---+ (e2,1t') 
(ci,p.)---+ (e\ ,Jt') 
µ(e) i= 0 
(if e then c1 else c~. 11.) ---+ (c1, p) 
1i(e) = 0 
(ife then c1 else c2,µ.)---+ (c2,µ) 
µ(e) = 0 
(while e do c, µ) ---+ µ 
(while e do c, µ) ---+ (c; while e do c, µ) 
Fig. 1. Transition semantics 
The rules define a transition relation ---t on configurations. A rnnfignndion 
rn is either a pair (c, tt), \vhere c is a command andµ is a memory, or simply 
a memory Jl. \Ve define the reflexive transitive closure ---t * in the usual way. 
First m ---t0 m, for any configuration m, and m ---t" m", fork > 0, if there is 
a configuration m' such that m ----tk-l m' and m' ---t m". Then m ---t* m' if 
m. ---tk m.' for some k 2': 0. 
A trace is a (possibly infinite) derivation sequence rn 1 ---t rn.2 ---t · · · \Vith 
finite prefixes m 1 ---t m 2 , rn 1 ---t rn2 ---t rn:;, and so on. And if (J' is a trace 
then so is every prefix of u. 
Definition 1. A 811fety prnperty i8 11 set S of traces such that for all tmce8 a, 
a i.~ in S iff ever·y finite pn;fi:r of a i.~ in S. A program is .rnfe if evfT?J tnu;e of it 
belongs to S. 
The "only-if" direction guarantees S is prefix closed, and the "if" direction allmvs 
us to reject an infinite trace by examining only a finite amount of it. If there is 
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an infinite trace that is not in S, then it must have a finite prefix that is also 
not in S. Hence safety cannot rule out behaviors that. amount to reaching Rome 
execution state infinitely often. 
\Ve also assume that the set of all finite traces in S is recursive. Although 
this need not be true of a safety property, it. seems reasonable given that one 
typically identifies a safety property with the ability to enforce it. at runtime by 
examining program traces of finite length. 
3 A characterization of secrecy 
\Ve want. to talk about secrecy in programs of our deterministic language so hmv 
should secretR be introduced'? \Vell there iR nothing intrirlRically Recret. about any 
integer so we should forget about associating secrecy with values. Instead, \Ve 
associate secrecy \vith the origin of a value which in our case will be the free 
variables of a program. So each variable is either high (secret) or low (public). 
The idea is that any initial value of a high variable is assumed to be secret. 
merely by virtue of being stored in a high variable. The initial value of a lmv 
variable is not secret. 
This origin-view of secrecy differs from the view held by others working \Vith 
assorted lambda calculi and type systems for secrecy [1, 3]. There, secrecy is as-
sociated \Vith values like boolean constants. It does not seem sensible to attribute 
any level of security to such constants. After all, what exactly is a "high-security'' 
boolean? Semantically, there is nothing that makes it high or lmv. Basic constants 
can be treated as high or lmv, and therefore we take the vie\v that they should be 
typed polymorphically in any type system where levels of classification become 
(partially-ordered) types. 
\Ve need to talk about secrecy violations. But \vhat constitutes a violation? 
Suppose k iR a lmv variable and h is a high variable \Vith initial value 17. Is 
the assignment k := 17 in violation of secrecy? Presumably not since it just got 
lucky and does not reliably reveal the value of h as h varies. On the other hand, 
k := h \vould be a violation. 
As another example, consider 
k := h; k := k - h 
Does it exhibit a violation'? Despite the first assignment, we might still regard 
the composition as secure since h is only temporarily stored in k which ahvays 
has final value ,.;ero. One might \Yonder though whether even temporary storage 
is a violation. It would be if execution could be suspended for some reason, say 
in an interleaved execution environment, and k's contents inspected. For now, 
we shall stay with deterministic sequential programs and focus on \vhat they are 
capable of doing upon normal termination. In this case, the composition \vould 
be secure. This also allows us to say that 
h := k; k := h 
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too is secure since there is no way to update h bcbvccn the assignments. 
One can begin to see the subtlety in deciding what constitutes a secrecy vio-
lation. In the end, it comes down to what is observable by users and programs. 
Users can ma.kc external observations of running programs and system behav-
ior on chosen inputs in order to learn secrets. Running time, resource usage, 
exceptions and so on are all valuable sources of information, provided by even 
well-designed programs, that can be observed outside a program and exploited. 
Programs, in contrast, make internal observations in that they are limited to 
whatever observations their semantics prescribe. Controlling these observations 
is much more tract.able as long as implementations are faithful to the semantics1 
and any program translation preserves the secrecy criterion of interest. \Vith 
a semantics at least, \Ve have a means of specifying and reasoning about the 
behaviors of programs and the observations they can ma.kc. \Ve shall concern 
ourselves \vith internal observations only. This is still useful. For instance, it 
treats a Ttojan Horse in mobile code that at.tempts to leak client secrets. 
So now that \Ve have some intuition behind secrecy, hmv do we formafoo:e it? 
There arc a number of different techniques such as process calculi equivalence 
[2], a PER model [6], and operational formulations [8-10]. In order to contrast 
secrecy with safety, we give a trace-based description. It is useful to first define 
a notion of configuration equivalence. :Memoriesµ and tl' are equivalent, written 
Jl "'11', if 11(v) = µ 1(v) for all low variables v. And (c,11)"' (d,µ 1) if c and c' are 
syntactically equal and µ "' 1-t'. 
Definition 2. Secrecy is a binary rdation R on tmcf!S where R((J, ()1) is tnw 
unless u has the form rn 1 ----+ rn'l ----+ · · · ----+ 11, u' has the form m'1 ----+ 
m~ ----+ · · · ----+ J.l1, m1 "' m'i and µ rf µ'. A program is secret if fl relates every 
pair' of its traces. 
Basically, secrecy is asserting that the final value of any low variable does not 
depend on the initial values of high variables. This definition applies only to 
deterministic programs. Notice that a program may be secret even though it has 
a finite trace and an infinite trace whose starting configurations arc equivalent. 
In other words, t ermination of a secret program can be affected by differences 
in the initial values of high variables. 
4 Contrasting secrecy with safety 
N oticc that secrecy relates program executions whereas a safety property docs 
not. This is the essential difference bct,vecn them. There arc some interesting 
consequences of this difference in terms of enforcing secrecy versus safety. 
Suppose we take the vie\v that a program may be unsafe but \Ve won't worry 
about its offending traces unless one of them tries to emerge during the current 
execution. So we don't try to convince ourselves once and for all that a program 
is safe. Instead we accept the fact it may be unsafe and put our trust in an 
1 Knowing when an implementation is faithful can also be tricky. 
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execution monitor to guard against ·unsafe behavior. This is an old idea from 
operating systems. A monitor works by monitoring the execution of a program 
and trapping it before it violates the policy being enforced [7]. It relies only on 
information available at runtime and does not examine the entire program being 
executed. Recovery from such traps may be possible in some applications. It is 
in these applications that monitoring is appealing because the complement of 
deciding whether a program is safe (call it unsafety) may be r.e. when safety is 
not. \Vhen safety is not r.e., we are immediately faced with incompleteness in 
any sound and r.e. logic for analyzing it. If the logic were complete then safety 
'vould be r.e. since \Ye 'vould have a way to accept safe programs: simply hand 
the given program off to the machine A1 accepting programs that have proofs in 
the logic. If Af accepts then we accept and we knmv \ve're correct because the 
logic is sound. And if the program is safe, then, by completeness, it has a proof 
and therefore Af will accept it. Incompleteness can be an obstacle in practice, 
depending on the logic. Execution monitoring avoids it. 
:vionitoring can also dovetail nicely with a machine J\1 accepting unsafety. J\1 
might cycle through all memories (suitably encoded) and run a given program 
on each of them for at most some fixed number of steps, where the memories 
and number of steps are governed by pair generation. If the unsafe behavior 
reveals itself within the number of steps allowed (guaranteed to be detectable 
by Af since the finite traces of a safety property form a recursive set), then J\1 
accepts. An execution monitor for unsafcty is essentially a lazy version of JI. 
Eventually the monitor might decide that a given program is unsafe but that 
does not concern UR unless the current run demonstrates it. 
\Ve need to be dear on the terms soundness and completeness. The monitor 
is a lazy version of Ai 'vhich accepts unsafety. Since Af accepts unsafety, \Ve 
have that if a program is unsafe then Af will say so (completeness) and if A1 
says a program is unsafe, it is indeed unsafe (soundnesR). Therefore, if Af never 
says a program is unsafe then the program is safe. This we take as a soundness 
criterion for M (and the monitor) with respect to the safety property at hand. 
Likewise, if a program is safe, then JI never says otherwise. And this \Ve ta.kc as 
a completeness criterion for A1 relative to safety. 
A similar technique can be used to prove that the complement of deciding 
whether a program is secret is r.c .. One can encode a pair of memories and adopt 
some convention for determining values of lmv variables, and then run the given 
program for at most a fixed number of steps on each memory in a generated pair 
when the memories are equivalent. If the runs terminate yielding inequivalent 
memories, then accept. But unlike the complement of safety, the technique here 
docs not dovetail with execution monitoring because it requires two memories. 
JVIonitoring involves only one, that of the current execution. So for this notion 
of secrecy, monitoring cannot be employed as a way to guard against secrecy 
violations as it was used to guard against safety violations. In fact, we can be 
more rigorous. As \Ve shall sec, one can prove there is no policy, implemented by 
an execution monitor, that implies secrecy and is complete. In contrast, there 
arc many safety properties that have sound and complete execution monitors. 
So what alternatives are there for enforcing secrecy'? 
One approach is to turn to a static analysis whereby \Ve attempt to shmv 
once and for all that a given program is secret. But we will be faced with in-
completeness in any sound and r.c. system for reasoning about secrecy because 
determining whether a program is secret is undecidable. Decidable type sys-
tems fall into this category [10]. Instead, one may adopt a very expressive logic 
and use verification conditions for establishing secrecy \Vithout worrying about 
mechanizing proofs. Work along these lines is described in [4]. 
In the next section, \VC shall sec an example of a program secrecy crite-
rion implied by a policy that. is implemented using an execution monitor. It is 
called weak secrecy. A disadvantage of weak secrecy is that it ignores indirect 
dependencies caused by branching hence the term "weak''. As a result , some 
programs satisfy weak secrecy but are not secret. But there are also secrect pro-
grams that do not satisfy \vcak secrecy, reflecting a basic requirement of safety. 
So neither property implies the other. The monitor is sound but incomplete for 
weak secrecy. It may trap a program that satisfies \veak secrecy. 
5 Weak secrecy 
Every trace has a corresponding branch-free program formed by sequencing up-
dates from those steps of the trace \vhosc derivations arc rooted with updates. 
For instance, if k, h E dom(µ) and µ(h) = 0, then corresponding to the trace 
(k := h; if h then k := 1 else k := 0, /L) (m1) 
---+ (if h then k := 1 else k := 0, µ[k := µ(h)]) (m2 ) 
---+ (k := 0, µ[k := µ(h)]) (m3) 
--+ 11.[k := 11.(h)][k :=OJ (m4) 
is the branch-free program k := h; k := 0. Not.ice that by rules (LOOP) and 
(nTlAl\CTT), the corresponding program for a trace may be empty. 
~ow we say that a program is weakly secret if every trace of it has a secret 
branch-free program. For instance, the program in the preceding example is not 
weakly secret. Traces m.1 --+ 1n2 and 1n1 ---+ m.2 --+ ·m:~ do not have secret. 
branch-free programs, but rn1 --+ n1.2 ---+ Tna --+ rn4 does. It may seem that 
we still have not defined a criterion for program secrecy that follows from some 
policy implemented by execution monitoring since \VC still cast our definition in 
terms of secrecy which relates program executions. But there is a policy that 
implies weak secrecy and it can be implemented by an execution monitor. 
5.1 A policy for weak secrecy and its monitor 
An execution monitor is given in Fig. 2 as a set of rules governing transitions 
that the monitor can make. Each transition has the form 
( ) M 1 C,Jl,q--tm,q 
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where q and q' arc states {k:} or {k,h}. The monitor is equipped to handle 
executionR of prograrnR with only two variableR, namely k and h, which are low 
and high variables respectively. A state indicates those variables whose values 
at that point are independent of initial values of h. This of course may change 
during execution depending upon updates to h. 
The policy iR captured by the (UPDATE) ruleR. If \Ve take Rt ate { k} to be the 
initial Rt.ate, then the third (UPDATE) rule, for irrntance, allowR a transition to 
state { k, h} because h is the target of the assignment and h does not occur in the 





k E dom(µ), h ~ e 
(k := c, 11.), {k} ~ ft[k := /t(c )),{k} 
h E dom(µ), h E e 
(h := c,p.), {k} ~ 11[h := 1i.(c)], {k} 
h E dom(11), h ~ c 
(h := c,p.), {k} ~ 11[h := p.(c)], {k,h} 
x E dom(p) 
(x := c, 11), {k, h} ~ 11[.r := p.(c)]. {k, h} 
M I I (ci,µ),q---+ µ ,q 
l'vf I I I (c1,µ),q---+ (c1,P ),q 
µ(e) # 0 
• 1\J (1fe then c1 else c2,p),q---+ (c1,µ),q 
µ(e) = 0 
Iv! (if e then c1 else c2,µ),q---+ (c2,µ),q 
µ(e) = 0 
( h "l d ) M w 1 e e o c, µ , q---+ µ, q 
µ(e) # 0 
(while e do c,µ),q ~ (c;while e do c,µ),q 
Fig. 2. An execution monitor 
once an evaluation reaches state { k, h}, it remains in { k, h} thereafter. In state 
{ k, h}, the monitor no longer has any effect on executions. This is where the 
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semantics of Fig. 1 and the monitor merge in the sense that for every command 
c, (c,µ)-----+ m if and only if (c,µ),{k,h} ~ m,{k,h}. 
Remark 1. One can think of the states in a transition as inherited and synthe-
sized at.tributes. Generalizing the execution monitor to handle more variables 
can be done by introducing a set I of variables, each of whose value is in-
dependent of the initial value of any high variable. There \vould actually be 
only tvm (CPDATE) rules. The first rule's hypothesis vmuld, for an assignment 
:r := e, require Vh E high. h E IV h rf_ e. Its RyntheRized attribute \VOuld be 
I U { :r}. The second rule's hypothesis vmuld require that. :r is a high variable and 
~h E high. h rf_ I/\ h E e. Its synthesi'.7,ed attribute v.rould be simply I. 
\Ve can regard a set of traces of the monitor as a safety property related to 
secrecy by the following theorem: 
Theorem 1. Let a be a trace of the monitor· starting in state { k}. Then every 
finite prefi:1: of a has a .~ecrd branch-free prngnnn. 
If the monitor never traps a given program on any input, when started in 
state { k}, then the program is weakly secret. However, a program may be weakly 
secret yet get trapped (e.g. k := h- h). The monitor also traps a secret program: 
k := h; k := k - h 
Herc there is a trace whose branch-free program is just k := h \Vhich is not secret. 
One might consider altering the monitor in some way to admit all executions of 
this program but then its traces would no longer be prefix closed as a trace for 
k := h would not exiRt if the monitor's policy implieR secrecy. It follows then that 
there is no monitor-enforced policy that is sound and complete for secrecy since 
the set of all traces of every monitor is prefix closed. Simply put, if the monitor 
executes k := h, then it's unsound, and if it doesn't, then it's incomplete. 
The monitor also ignores indirect dependencies. For instance, it does not trap 
if h then k := 1 else k := 0 
even though the program is not secret. 
6 Concluding remarks 
Execution monitoring has been a useful mechanism for implementing various 
policies. It is important to distinguish policies from properties. A policy implies 
a property, and in some cases, may be more restrictive than it needs to be in 
order to imply the property. The execution monitor presented here implernentR 
a policy that. implies weak secrecy in the sense that if it never trapR a given 
program on any input, \:Vhen started in state {k}, then the program is weakly 
secret. It docs not hmvcvcr imply secrecy. In fact, no policy implemented by an 
execution monitor can imply secrecy and be complete. 
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An interesting direction to pursue is completeness of the monitor for \veak 
secrecy, that is, trying to extend the monitor RO that it never traps a \veakly secret 
program. Doing this for a more realistic set of expressions would be challenging. 
\Ve assumed that expressions are executed atomically and that the monitor can 
inspect an expression at runtime. But expressions obviously can be far more 
complex, involving function calls, conditional expressions, exceptions and side 
effectR. One cannot asRnrne theRe Rorts of expressions execute atomically. 
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